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In social species, groups face a variety of threats from conspecific outsiders.
Defensive actions are therefore common, but there is considerable variation
in which individuals contribute and to what extent. There has been some
theoretical exploration of this variation when the defence is of shared
resources, but the relative contributions when a single intruder threatens a
particular breeding position have received less attention. Defensive actions
are costly, both for the individual and dependent young, and contributions
are likely to differ depending on individual sex, rank and size, current breed-
ing stage, infanticide risk and relatedness levels. Here, we model analytically
the relative fitness benefits of different group members to engaging in
defence against individual intruders and determine when within-group
conflicts of interest might arise over these defensive contributions. Conflicts
of interest between the challenged breeder and other group members
depend on relatedness to the brood and the potential relatedness reduction
if an intruder acquires breeding status. Conflicts are more likely to occur
when there is a low chance of winning the contest, low infanticide rates, inef-
ficient defence from helpers, a long remaining brood-dependency period
and high external (non-contest-related) mortality. Our work can help explain
variation in defensive actions against out-group threats.1. Introduction
In social species from hymenopterans to humans, relatively stable and permanent
groups form for a variety of reasons [1]. These groups and their members often
face threats from rival conspecific groups and individuals [2–5]. When the out-
group threat is to shared resources such as food or the whole territory [2,3,6],
there may be clear costs of losing for all or most group members and so an incen-
tive for joint defence. Despite this, collective-action problems [7] can lead to some
variation in the amount each group member commits to resource defence [8,9].
When the out-group threat is to a breeding position, whereby an individual intru-
der is seeking to usurp a particular existing breeder [4,5,10], the interests of group
members are even less likely to be perfectly aligned, and considerable within-
group variation exists in defensive contributions [10,11]. Explaining the factors
influencing this variation in group defensive actions is fundamental to a full
understanding of social evolution.
Precisely which group members contribute to defence against an individual
intruder, and how much they contribute, will differ depending on a range of
costs and benefits relating to individual sex, rank and size, current breeding
stage, infanticide risk and relatedness levels. Defensive actions are costly:
when contests escalate to violence, injury or even death can ensue [12]; all
exchanges with outsiders, whether signalling or physical, take time and
energy, reducing current and future foraging and parental-care opportunities
[13,14]. There are also clear potential costs from losing a contest with an indi-
vidual intruder, ranging from loss of the breeding position for the same-sex
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2breeder [11,15] to loss of the current brood owing to infanti-
cide [16]; there are concomitant benefits from winning such
contests, and thus preventing these actions. Each individual
must therefore trade-off the relevant costs and benefits
when deciding how much to contribute to defence on a
given occasion, and that trade-off will differ between group
members. For example, while the replaced breeder loses all
future mating chances, the other breeder can continue to
reproduce with the intruder; aggression towards intruders
is therefore typically sex-specific [11,17], but can also be
influenced by social rank [3,18]. The size and condition
of individuals should also affect decisions about defence
participation, with those who are larger and in a better
condition likely to contribute more [3,14]. Similarly, the age
of any current offspring will probably influence the trade-
off, as older offspring may be less vulnerable to temporary
reductions in parental care or to infanticidal attacks [16].
Finally, relatedness will be important, with those group
members losing most from future reproduction by an
unrelated intruder expected to contribute more to defence
against them [3,19]. While there have been empirical studies
considering each of these factors, understanding their
interplay is more complex.
Theoretical modelling can help to generate testable pre-
dictions about the variation in within-group contributions
to defensive actions when a breeding position is threatened
by an outsider. To date, models of social behaviour have
focused on either the causes of group formation or helping
[20–22], or have predicted individual levels of parental care
[23–26], reproductive skew [27,28] or defence of a common
good [29]. For the case of defending a common good,
Gavrilets & Fortunato [30] have used the adaptive-dynamics
framework and individual-based simulations to consider
contributions to joint defence with respect to the collective-
action problem. Their model led to two major predictions.
First, dominant group members that can secure a higher
share of resources within a group should engage substantially
more in collective defence than lower-ranked group members.
Second, individuals should increase their defence contribution
with higher within-group relatedness. However, the trade-offs
in costs and benefits will probably differ when the threat is to
an individual breeder. Here, we focus on the situation when
a breeder’s position is threatened by an individual outsider
and quantify when social defensive behaviour ceases to be
beneficial for group members.
Inclusive fitness is a powerful concept to understand
the evolution of social behaviours and has been usefully
applied in explaining the evolution of altruism [31,32],
cooperation [33] and eusociality [34] (see [35] for an alternative
viewpoint). The inclusive fitness of an individual summarizes
its expected genetic contribution to the next generation based
on its behaviour; an optimal action in an evolutionary sense
is having the highest inclusive fitness value. Inclusive fitness
can be calculated for several different actions; for example,
whether an individual contributes to defence against an intru-
der and how much it contributes. Here, we use the inclusive
fitness concept to calculate when conflict arises between
group members over defensive responses to individual intru-
ders seeking breeding status. We calculate inclusive fitness
values for different group members—two breeders, one
helper—and identify when interests diverge and, thus, when
within-group conflict is likely to occur with respect to
out-group contests.2. Model
We propose an analytic model investigating the within-group
consequences of interactions between a focal group and one
intruding outsider trying to obtain a breeding position
within the group. The model focuses on the consequences for
two reproductive events: the current brood, produced by the
breeders in the focal group prior to the interactionwith the out-
sider; and the brood produced after that interaction with the
outsider, when either the same breeders reproduce or the
brood is produced by the remaining breeder and the outsider
who has successfully obtained the other breeding position.
We consider the effect of various factors—size differences
between the breeders and the helper and between the breeders
and the outsider, infanticide risk, within-group relatedness,
duration of the remaining brood-dependency period and exter-
nal mortality—on inclusive fitness for group members and
thus the potential conflict between them.
The general situation that we model is commonly found in
a wide range of species, including, but not limited to, coopera-
tively breeding vertebrates [36]. As just a few examples, species
where groups can face an outside threat from single intruders
include: birds such as Arabian babblers (Turdoides squamiceps)
[37]; subdesert mesites (Monia benschi) [38], green woodhoo-
poes (Phoeniculus purpureus) [39] and pied babblers (Turdoides
bicolor) [40]; fishes such as Lamprologus brichardi [41] and
Neolamprologus pulcher [11]; and mammals such as African
lions (Panthera leo) [42], Thomas langurs (Presbytis thomasi)
[43] and black howler monkeys (Alouatta igra) [44]. In the
small cichlid fish N. pulcher, for instance, territorial social
groups consist of a dominant breeding pair, 1–20 sexually
mature but non-breeding subordinate helpers of various
sizes, and dependent offspring of the breeders [11,45,46]. Intru-
sions by out-group individuals can represent a threat to the
position of existing similarly sized group members, including
the breeders [46], but all group members can contribute to
defence against conspecifics [11,45]. In African lions, prides
consist of 1–9 adult males, 1–18 adult breeding and non-
breeding females, and their dependent offspring [42]. Outsider
males (including single individuals) compete to gain residence
in prides and thus a reproductive position [42]; incomingmales
present an infanticidal risk, because they may attempt to kill
cubs of resident females to bring the latter into oestrus
sooner [47]. Consequently, both resident males and females
may engage in defence against conspecific intruders [42,48].
(a) Social group and intruder
The focal group in our model consists of two breeders and one
non-breeding helper (the simplest scenario), caring for a brood
produced by the current breeders. The breeding pair comprises
an individual of the same sex as the intruder (BS), and thus
under direct threat of losing its breeding position, and an indi-
vidual of the opposite sex to the intruder (BO); the intruder is
denoted with I and the helper with H (figure 1).
We consider four different family relations between
breeders and the helper:
(i) Hunrel is a helper who is unrelated to both BS and BO.
The relatedness coefficient between the helper and the
brood (runrel) is 0;
(ii) HO is either an offspring or sibling of BO, but not BS; in
both cases, the helper’s relatedness coefficient to the
current brood (rO) is 0.25;
IBS
BO
H
brood
Figure 1. Group set-up in the example of a fish species. BS, the same-sex
breeder as the intruder; BO, the opposite-sex breeder to the intruder; H, the
helper and I, the intruder. BS and BO are equally sized. H’s size can range
from half the size to the same size as the breeders. I’s size can range from
the same size to 25% larger than the breeders. Silhouettes are based on
photographs of Neolamprologus pulcher taken by Ines Braga Goncalves.
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both cases, its relatedness coefficient to the current brood
(rS) is 0.25; and
(iv) HSO is an offspring of the breeders; its relatedness coeffi-
cient to the current brood (rSO) is 0.5.
In cooperatively breeding species, for example, all four of
these scenarios are common; there is variation within and
between species in their frequency of occurrence [36,49].
Such cooperatively breeding groups are commonly founded
on nuclear family units with the previous offspring of the
breeders retained to help (HSO scenario). Relatedness to the
current offspring being helped can be reduced when one of
the helper’s parents dies, disperses or is replaced; a related-
ness of 0.25 also arises when same-sex siblings disperse
together but only one breeds (HO and HS scenarios). Helping
by unrelated individuals is also common (Hunrel scenario);
more so than previously recognized [49]. As a specific
example, helper-to-brood relatedness coefficients have been
shown to range from 0 to 0.5 in the cooperatively breeding
cichlid N. pulcher [50].
The relative size difference between antagonists often influ-
ences contest outcome in nature [51], and intruders can be
larger or smaller than breeders. However, intruders that are
smaller than a breeder do not pose a threat, either because
smaller intruders do not attempt a contest or, if they do, the
contest is quickly settled in favour for the breeder with a
low-cost signalling exchange. We therefore focus our model
on intruders that are at least the size of the two breeders,
which we assume are equally large. To capture a size advan-
tage of the intruder over BS (and BO), we introduce the
parameter sI (see the electronic supplementary material, table
S1 for a full list of notations). This parameter can take non-
negative values; for example, sI ¼ 0 means that the intruder is
the same size as BS and sI ¼ 0.25 means that the intruder is
1.25 times the size of BS. Helpers are often smaller than the
breeders, and so we allow the size of the helper to be smaller
or up to the same size as the breeders (see parameter k2 below).(b) The contest
The intruder challenges the breeding position of BS and, if
successful, replaces BS. This replacement occurs when the
group’s defence (the total amount of involvement in the con-
test provided by all group members) is below a threshold. BS,
BO and H can all potentially participate in the contest; the
current brood cannot participate. Defeating a very large
intruder requires more involvement, so we assume that the
threshold for winning, wmin(sI), increases with the intruder’s
size advantage sI:
wmin(sI) ¼ exp[ln(1)exp(k1sI)], ð2:1Þ
where 1 is the minimal amount of involvement needed to
defeat an intruder of the same size as the breeders. To capture
the many scenarios of how fast the threshold of total group
involvement increases with sI, we introduce parameter k1.
This parameter can take any value above 1 (although values
larger than 20 are probably unrealistic); the larger k1, the
faster the threshold rises with size advantage sI (see the
electronic supplementary material, A.1 and figure S1).
If the group wins, BO and BS produce a new brood; if the
group loses, I replaces BS, and BO produces a new brood
with I. When an intruder takes over a breeding position in a
group, there is the possibility of infanticide, which we capture
with the parameter m. This parameter ranges from 0 (no infan-
ticide) to 1 (all offspring of the current brood are killed). An
intermediate value of m either means that a fraction m of the
current brood is killed by the successful intruder or that the
intruder kills all offspring with probability m; both scenarios
are mathematically equivalent. In the natural world, there is
wide variation in infanticide rates [52]; for example, no sexually
selected infanticide in grizzly bears (Ursus arctos) [53] or bats
[54], some reported instances of infanticide in barn swallows
(Hirundo rustica) [55], and experimentally estimated high
rates (13–50%) of infanticide in collared lemmings (Dicrostonyx
groenlandicus) [56]. In our model, infanticide does not reduce
the time until the next reproductive bout because we are inter-
ested in the conflict between group members rather than in the
best reproductive strategy of the intruder.
In the event of a takeover by I, the relatedness coefficients
between the helper and future brood can change. Specifically,
while runrel and rO will stay the same, rSO decreases from 0.5
to 0.25, and rS decreases from 0.25 to 0.
(c) Involvement in the contest
Each group member (apart from the brood) can defend the
breeding position of BS against the intruder by choosing an
amount of involvement in the contest, ranging from0 (no invol-
vement) to 1 (maximal involvement). Contest involvement
carries a survival cost and we assume that survival decreases
linearly with involvement. That means, an involvement of w
reduces survival by a factor of 12 w. If a group member gets
involved in the contest at the maximal level (w ¼ 1), it sacrifices
its life in the contest. Individual involvement is denoted with
wBS for BS, wBO for BO and wH for the helper.
Group members may vary in their effectiveness in defence
depending on, for instance, their size and strength. To capture
this potential difference in defence effectiveness between bree-
ders and helpers, we introduce parameter k2. This parameter
can take continuous values including and above 1; k2 ¼ 1
means that breeders andhelper are of the same size and equally
effective in defence, while, for example, k2 ¼ 2 means that
4royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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is discounted by 0.5. In other words, if k2 ¼ 2 then two units of
a helper’s involvement count asmuch as one unit of a breeder’s
involvement. As an example, in the cooperatively breeding
cichlids L. brichadi and N. pulcher, helpers are about 2.5–5 cm
long and breeders 6–6.5 cm long [41,57], which translates
into k2-values between 1.2 and 1.6. In general, and for any set-
ting of k2, the total group involvement amounts to
F ¼ wBS þ wBO þ ð1=k2ÞwH (see the electronic supplementary
material, A.2).
(d) Intruder investment in the contest
The intruder must invest in the contest if it is to replace BS,
and its investment should depend on its size advantage
over BS. For instance, if I is verymuch larger than BS, its invest-
ment can be lower than when I and BS are of the same size.
We distinguish between ‘investment’ (by the intruder) and
‘involvement’ (by groupmembers) to avoid the misconception
that comparing group involvement to intruder investment
decides the contest outcome. Rather, the contest outcome is
dependent on whether group involvement exceeds the
threshold of minimal involvement needed and this threshold
increases with the size advantage of the intruder (see above).
We capture the impact of the size advantage of I over BS on
the intruder’s investment with the function wI(sI):
wIðsIÞ ¼
1
1þ ðsI=1Þ : ð2:2Þ
We thus assume that the intruder’s investment decreases expo-
nentially from 1 (when sI ¼ 0, i.e. BS and I are of the same size)
and converges to zero for very large values of sI; see the
electronic supplementary material, A.3 and figure S2.
(e) Dependence of brood
During and after a contest, the current brood suffers from lower
survival for two potential reasons. First, because parental care
is lower when group members are involved in the contest or
need to recover from it; this cost is apparent regardless of the
contest outcome. Second, because of the risk of infanticide if
the intruder replaces BS. Both survival costs, however, are les-
sened with brood age; as the brood approaches independence,
the remaining period of parental care is shorter and the likeli-
hood of infanticide is lower. To capture the impact of
remaining brood dependence on brood survival, we introduce
the parameter k3 and assume a cost function, F(c, k3):
F(c, k3) ¼ cþ (1 c)ek3 , ð2:3Þ
where c captures the survival probability of dependent brood
both during and after a contest (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material, A.4 for more details). The parameter k3 can take
any value above and including zero and determines the rate at
which brood costs decrease with decreasing time to indepen-
dence (electronic supplementary material, figure S3). In
biological terms, a value of k3 ¼ 0 means that all the brood is
independent; intermediate values of k3 (0, k3, 5) mean that
some period of brood dependency is left; and for k3  5,
nearly the full duration of brood dependence remains.
( f ) External mortality
We assume that the breeders, the helper and the intruder have
the same baseline survival rate. It is possible that smallerhelpers are more vulnerable than larger breeders. However,
if a helper faces lower survival chances then it might be even
more reluctant to become involved in a contest,which increases
the potential for conflicting interests within the group. Our
assumption of equal survival rates is therefore conservative.
In our model, we test several values of external survival
rates, psurv, ranging from very low ( psurv ¼ 0.1) to certain
( psurv ¼ 1), the latter being equivalent to no external mortality.
Among bird species, for example, survival rates vary hugely
depending on a wide range of factors [58].
(g) Inclusive fitness
The inclusive fitness values for both contest outcomes (lost or
won), for all group members (BS, BO and H ), and for all
family relations (Hunrel, HO, HS and HSO) are derived and given
in the electronic supplementarymaterial, B.A conflict of interest
within the group occurs when one group member would have
higher inclusive fitness when the group defeats the intruder,
while a different group member prefers a lost contest. The
latter can arise if winning the contest requires such a large invol-
vement that the individual’s inclusive fitness value is higher
when the contest is lost with zero involvement. We term the
point in parameter space at which the inclusive fitness from
losing the contest exceeds the value from winning as a ‘switch
point’. For each group member, losing the contest can at times
be better than winning (see the electronic supplementary
material, C). However, the conditions for this to happen vary
among the group members, such that there is a within-group
conflict about contest involvement with the intruder.3. Results
Each group member (except Hunrel) can have a switch point,
when it pays to change from participating in defence against
an individual intruder seeking a breeding position to not par-
ticipating in that defence. The position of the switch point
varies among group members; however, the switch points
for BS and HS, and those for BO and HO, coincide (electronic
supplementary material, C.3).
Each panel in figure 2 shows the inclusive fitness returns of
different group members as a function of one parameter.
Moving from left to right, the sequence of switch points
among group members is the same in all six panels: first HO
(and also BO), second HSO and third HS (and also BS). Thus,
the switch points predict the loyalty of group members to BS
(measured in size of parameter space where interests are
aligned; figure 3): HS is always loyal to BS, HSO is somewhat
less loyal, BO and HO are even less loyal and Hunrel is least
loyal. The ordering of switch points is driven by the relatedness
of groupmembers to the current brood and the drop in related-
ness after a takeover: rS decreases strongly (from 0.25 to 0, 100%
reduction); rSO decreases by the same extent but stays at amod-
erate level (from 0.5 to 0.25, 50% reduction); rBO and rO are
unaffected by a takeover (they remain at 0.5 and 0.25 respect-
ively, 0% reduction); and runrel is zero in any case. Loyalty is
thus stronger the larger the relative reduction in relatedness
between current and future broods after the takeover.
There are two scenarios in which the interests of the group
members are aligned. First, when every groupmember receives
higher fitness when defeating the intruder (yellow area in
figure 3). Second,when every groupmember receives higher fit-
nesswhen not becoming involved in the contest (dark blue area
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Figure 2. The helper’s inclusive fitness when defending (becoming involved in the contest with the intruder) and defeating the intruder (black) and when not
defending and the intruder takes over BS’s position (red). Panels show inclusive fitness as functions of the (a) size difference between intruder and breeders (sI);
(b) steepness of the threshold curve for involvement that is required to successfully defend against the intruder (k1); (c) probability of infanticide (m); (d ) duration of
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within the group: when BS receives higher fitness returns from
being involved in a contest that is won, but another group
member receives lower returns (grey area in figure 3).
Switch points are generally found in the area of parameter
space that corresponds to low chances of defeating the intru-
der (large k1 and/or large sI), low infanticide rates (small m),
long remaining brood-dependency periods (large k3), ineffi-
cient helpers (large k2) and low external survival rates (low
psurv). Below, we discuss each parameter in terms of its
effect on contest costs (cost of involvement) and on outcome
costs (cost of takeover).
(a) Low chances of defeating the intruder render
contest costs high and takeover costs low
The parameters sI and k1 both affect the costs of involvement
and outcome. On the one hand, the bigger the intruder, the
more the group needs to get involved to win the contest,
and consequently the lower resulting inclusive fitness for
each group member (figure 2a; electronic supplementarymaterial, C). Similarly, the required involvement for winning,
and the accompanied costs, increase with k1 (which defines
how fast the group involvement needed to overturn an intru-
der increases with the size advantage of the intruder,
figure 2b). On the other hand, the bigger the intruder, the
less it needs to invest in the contest, the higher its chances
to survive to produce the second brood. All of which mani-
fests in higher fitness returns for BO, HO and HSO in the
case of a takeover (figure 2a,b; electronic supplementary
material, C). Taken together, fitness returns from a takeover
will exceed those from defeating the intruder at large
values of k1 and sI for some group members but not yet for
BS, which would lead to a within-group conflict. The area
of parameter space without conflict is either at low sI- and
k1-values, when the best option for all group members is to
defeat the intruder (yellow area in figure 4a,b), or at large
sI- and k1-values, when the best option for all group members
is not to defend against the intruder (blue area in figure 4a).
External mortality affects the positioning of these areas, and
high mortality shifts the blue area (no defence by all) into
lower regions of sI and k1.
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long dependency period renders contest costs high
The parameters measuring infanticide and brood dependency
both affect brood-related costs. A greater infanticide riskincreases the cost of a takeover to group members because it
lowers the fitness return derived from the current brood
(figure 2c; electronic supplementary material, C). Thus, the
higher the probability of infanticide, the more likely that BS
and all other group members derive higher fitness returns
7royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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ficiently low, such that BS also has higher fitness returns when
the intruder takes over and does not kill the current brood, then
the interests of group members can again be perfectly aligned,
but this time in terms of not becoming involved in the contest.
Contest costs, in terms of lower brood survival, increase with
the duration of the dependency period, i.e. with k3 (figure 2d;
electronic supplementary material, C). Thus, if k3 is sufficiently
large, then a contest that needs a lot of involvement is less
favourable for some group members, but not BS, and within-
group conflict can be expected. If external mortality is high,
no within-group conflict occurs at high infanticide rates
(yellow area in figure 4c). At low infanticide rates, and when
the current brood is somewhat dependent (i.e. k3. 0),
within-group conflict can occur (light blue and green area in
figure 4c). If external mortality is low, the area of no conflict
(yellow area in figure 4d) is larger.
(c) Small and inefficient helpers increase contest costs
Small helpers are less efficient in defending than breeders
and the group needs to raise more involvement to compensate
this inefficiency. More involvement of the helper, however,
decreases brood survival, and more involvement of the bree-
ders lowers their survival and thus reproductive chances.
Therefore, parameter k2, which measures a helper’s ineffi-
ciency, increases the costs of defending against the intruder
(figure 2e; electronic supplementary material, C). If k2 is suffi-
ciently large, the fitness returns from not getting involved in
the contest can exceed the returns from getting involved for
some group members other than BS, leading to within-group
conflict. As parameter k2 increases contest costs—in the same
way as the parameters sI and k1—the interaction of k2 and
either sI or k1 with external mortality rates is similar to that of
sI and k1 (figure 4e,f shows the interaction between k1 and k2).
That means the interests of group members are aligned at
low k1- and k2-values, when the best option for all groupmem-
bers is to defeat the intruder, and at large k1- and k2-values,
when the best option is to let the intruder take over.
(d) External mortality lowers chances of future
reproduction and increases the importance of
fitness returns from the current brood
The higher the external mortality, the less likely it is that
breeders (and the successful intruder) will survive to the next
reproductive event. Expected fitness returns from the future
brood thus decrease with external mortality (figure 2f;
electronic supplementary material, C), and high mortality
increases the area of parameter space in which within-group
conflict can occur (figure 4). At the same time, external
mortality increases the relative share of fitness returns from
the current brood (see its interaction with brood-related
parameters in figure 4c,d), which can render a costly involve-
ment not worth the effort for group members other than BS.
Thus, within-group conflict is more likely to occur when
external mortality is high.4. Discussion
This study presents a predictive model to assess when conflicts
of interest arise among group members over contributions todefence against a single intruder seeking to seize a breeding
position. In this scenario, the costs and benefits to individuals
are likely to differ considerably on at least some occasions. Suf-
ficiently high contest costs and sufficiently low takeover
costs—or vice versa—can prevent within-group conflicts over
defensive contributions. However, when contest and takeover
costs are at intermediate levels, such that the cost–benefit ratios
are below one for some group members (costs exceeding
benefits) and above one (benefits exceeding costs) for others,
we predict within-group conflict. Generally, an increased size
advantage of the intruder, threshold for winning a contest,
helper inefficiency and length of remaining brood dependency
increase contest costs. Infanticide risk increases takeover costs,
and external mortality amplifies the importance of the current
brood to the overall lifetime fitness, thus acting as a catalyst for
within-group conflict.
Our model, considering defence against a single intruder,
results in some similar and some different predictions to
those arising from the modelling of defence against a
common threat tomany groupmembers. Collective-action pro-
blems (CAP) in the latter scenario mean that some variation in
the level of defence is expected—for instance, dominant group
members contributing more than subordinates to defensive
actions—but similar input fromdominants of both sexes is pre-
dicted [30]. In our model, this is mirrored by a breeder having
the largest parameter space in which they favour defence
against the outsider, but it is the challenged breeder which
shows the greatest interest in defensive activity as they face
the greatest potential threat; the interests of the two dominants
are less strongly aligned thanwhen defending a commongood.
As in defence against a common threat, where defensive contri-
butions increasewith increasingwithin-group relatedness [30],
our model predicts that the helper’s inclination to defend
increases with its relatedness to the challenged breeder.
Individual threats—rather than group threats—imply that in
some circumstances, cooperative defence ceases to be beneficial
for some but not all group members. Using our modelling
approach, we identified when conflicts among groupmembers
arise over their contributions to defence against a single intru-
der.We predict a sequence of withdrawal ofmember’s support
for defending against the intruder; the sequence is determined
by their relatedness to the challenged breeder (for the helpers)
and the cost–benefit ratio (for the other breeder). Furthermore,
we predict that high extrinsic mortality can increase within-
group conflict—an aspect that has to our knowledge not
been investigated within the CAP framework.
In our model, we focus on indirect benefits, but group
members could also gain direct benefits. Some direct benefits
are gained by all from being in a (larger) group, such as protec-
tion from predators or protection of resources; other direct
benefits are more specific to helpers, such as having access to
foraging resources, gaining experience of raising young, or
inheriting a territory; and still others are more specific to bree-
ders, such as keeping reproductive status or receiving parental
care for their offspring [1,36]. Including direct benefits that
apply to all group members and those that do not refer to
inheriting or maintaining breeding status would probably
have limited effect on the predictions of our model, because
those benefits are often derived independently of contest out-
come, especially given that group size does not change in our
model. The case is somewhat different for a helper inheriting
a breeding position. For example, the interests of a helper unre-
lated to the unchallenged breeder (HS) might no longer be fully
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be more likely to inherit the breeding position from the intru-
der, thus increasing the probability of within-group conflict.
Direct benefits might also be increasingly important to con-
sider with increasing group size; our model was based on
two breeders and a single helper, a common scenario in facul-
tative cooperatively breeding vertebrates [36], but could be
extended to larger and more complex groups by adding an
equation for each additional breeder and helper. In these
additional equations, relatedness to the breeders would need
to be adjusted, and the contribution of each group member
to brood care and contest would need to be specified.
Another assumption of our current model is that future
breeding success depends on the survival of the breeders
but not that of the helper. The costs of a contest are thus
higher if the involvement comes from the breeders, and invol-
vement of the helper is therefore prioritized in our model.
However, as a challenged breeder has the greatest risk from
the intrusion (the potential loss of their breeding position),
it is reasonable to assume that the challenged breeder gets
most involved. Adding a further assumption on how helper
survival affects future breeding success would not change
the main conclusions. We expect that the additional assump-
tion would predict somewhat higher breeder involvement
such that other group members can contribute less, which
would result in less within-group conflict. So, while the
absolute position of switch points might shift, the relative
order in which they arise would stay the same, and there
would still be identifiable regions of parameter space where
conflicts of interest between group members arise.
A few existing experimental studies have tested defensive
contributions by group members faced with a single outsider
seeking a breeding position and thus relate to the predictions
of our model. For instance, Desjardins et al. [11] considered
responses of N. pulcher cichlids to breeder-sized conspecific
intruders (as well as predators) in captive-based experiments.
In general, there was a stronger defence against a breeding
threat by the relevant dominant group member, and greater
defence by breeders than helpers; there was no evidence for
a correlation between defence rates and the degree of size
difference between defenders and intruders [11]. As another
example, McComb et al. [59,60] have used playback exper-
iments with wild African lions to simulate intrusions by
outsiders, including both females and males. In the latter
case, females show much stronger responses to unfamiliar
cf. resident males, because the former represent an infantici-
dal risk to young cubs [60]. Such experimental studies are
relatively rare and have tended to consider individual factors
of importance in defensive decisions; our model suggests that
the effect of different factors can interact in their influence on
when and how much group members should contribute to
defence against individual intruders.
To test hypotheses arising from our model, both between-
and within-species empirical studies would be useful in thefuture. Phylogenetically controlled meta-analyses are increas-
ingly used to test behavioural and evolutionary questions, not
least because of the widespread availability of both relevant
phylogenies and datasets containing information on ecological,
life-history and social traits ([61] and references therein). Since
our model pertains to various biological systems (see section
Model), sufficient data from a range of species are probably
available for such testing. As one potential example, infanticide
occurs in only some species and even then is sex-specific, with
males being the perpetrators in most cases [16]. As our model
predicts that the probability of within-group conflict is largest
when the infanticide risk is lowest, meta-analyses could
consider comparisons of both species that do and do not exhibit
infanticide as well as comparisons of infanticidal species where
the intruder is or is not the infanticidal sex; group members of
the species with higher infanticide risk should exhibit the
same behaviour towards intruders, while those from lower
infanticide risks should exhibit more varied responses to the
intruder. In terms of within-species testing, ideally, there
would be an experimental element potentially manipulating,
for instance, the identity of the intruder or the relative size of
the helper in a group. The cichlid fish N. pulcher provides an
example of an excellent model for this kind of study, as they
are group-living, face intrusions from individual outsiders,
live and breed in captivity and have been shown to be amenable
to out-group conflict manipulations [5,11].
In summary, our theoretical model suggests several
different scenarios in which within-group conflict would be
expected over defensive actions against individual conspecific
intruders. Since within-group conflict is costly, conflict-
management strategies are expected to evolve to minimize
those costs. Indeed, there are now good examples of both
aggressive and affiliative within-group behaviour before,
during or after a conflict with outsiders [62]. Moving forward,
there is a need to model these consequences of out-group
conflict too. For now, ourwork can help to understand the vari-
ation seen in when and how much group members assist a
breeder to repel an outsider. A full understanding of the evol-
ution and maintenance of sociality requires greater integration
between studies of within- and between-group interactions.
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